Irina Shutova - SPBGU, Baltic and Scandinavian Studies

Kaliningrad is one Russian exclave that cuts off from mainland by two different states and that has many variants for its future.

This city has a great history. It is the youngest, the smallest and westernmost region in Russia. However, the development of the district was insufficient. For a long time it was isolated and neglected by Russian authorities and European countries as well. During the 1990s Russian economic crisis of August 1998 causes deep social and economic crisis in Kaliningrad. It was the first step to review of Russian Kaliningrad’s policy. The second step was the EU enlargement in 2004. It has lead to more active policy of Russian authorities in relation to this region. Kaliningrad is important subject of the Russian Federation. It has a great industrial potential first. Its major industries are manufacturing, shipping, fishing and amber products. Second, it is the only Russian Baltic Sea port.

The EU that neglected Kaliningrad as a significant region before has begun to pay more attention on it lately. The EU has become more involved after the designation of Kaliningrad as a Special Economic Zone especially. Nowadays, the European Commission has its special program for Kaliningrad. It provides funds for business projects under this program. The region has begun to show an increasing trade with the countries of the EU. Kaliningrad shows an economic growth nowadays partly due to the EU policy. The region has become more integrated in the EU.

Such ambivalent situation causes two groups of problems related to this topic. The first one is about movement of goods and people between Kaliningrad, the rest of Russia and the EU countries. And the second group is internal situation in Kaliningrad. I am not going to speak about it in detail, because the fundamental problem is the future position of the region. How to develop cooperation between Kaliningrad, Moscow and Brussels? Is Kaliningrad is going to be a part or a pilot project for EU-Russian cooperation?

The last project shows that Moscow holds the key and it does not want Kaliningrad to play as an independent actor in relations with the EU. Kaliningrad is expecting to become a significant energy supplier. Yes, I am speaking about the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant. The project was established in 2007. It is the joint venture ALTSOM-Atomenergomash and Rosatom Group. As it said in official descriptions of the project it is going to provide a reliable supply of electricity to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and to offset the lack of electricity in neighboring nations by exporting power to those countries. No doubt, the project has a great potential and purposes. It will become an essential contribution to the region development as well.

It seems to become a great project. Of course, there are some challenges, for instance, concerning potential investors. It is not decided yet which foreign companies will participate in the project. Moreover, there are some protests of European Greens. But in relation to our topic we can conclude that it is firstly political project. It can give the opportunity to Russia to increase the energetic dominance in the region. It can contribute to better cooperation in the region. And finally, Kaliningrad can become a center for such cooperation. It can become a necessary puzzle for Moscow and Brussels relationships firstly and for Russian, Polish and Lithuanian cooperation secondly. This project can make the region more integrated and developed. 

To introduce clarity into the place of Kaliningrad in the project and the future, I am not sure that the regional cooperation is possible without an active participation of central authorities in Russia. Many decisions are made in Moscow. That is why Kaliningrad cannot become an independent player in the project. However, it will get great benefits from the project. Second, I am sure that economic cooperation always leads to better political collaboration. It means that two existing groups of problems is expecting to be easily solved in Kaliningrad.

To sum up, the foundation stone of Russia’s Baltic Nuclear Power Plant was laid in February 2010. And I believe that this stone has become not only the beginning of project but also new vision of Kaliningrad as a significant Russian region and a puzzle for Russian-EU cooperation. 

Rafał Jewdokimow - Jagiellonian University - Cracow

Local border traffic agreement with the Kaliningrad Oblast as a field of cooperation between EU and Russia

Kaliningrad Oblast remains the important region for relations between European Union and Russian Federation. In some measure it even becomes field directed on getting closer to Europe. From historical perspective Saint Petersburg has been seen in XVIII century as “the window to Europe” for Russia. Nowadays, this role could be taken namely by Kaliningrad Region. Partnership between Moscow and Brussels was launched thanks to Partnership and Cooperation agreement (24 June 1994) and now it is provided mainly within the framework of so-called “Four Common Spaces”. In the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice visa issues (and facilitation of travelling) between these international actors are discussed. Bearing in mind politicization of negotiations on visa facilitation, which is noticeable recently, Kaliningrad region is seen as important field of cooperation – successful one. Since 2004 both partners have aimed at strengthen transborder cooperation with Russian exclave in many fields like supporting small and medium enterprises, increasing economic relations, energy efficiency, educational and cultural exchange[1].

The role of Poland in this process is undoubtedly crucial.  Thanks to determination of Polish officials agreement between the Government of the Polish Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on local border traffic[2] was signed.  It should be underlined, that it was an exception from European law. European rules allow EU member states to create this simplified border traffic in the territory up to 30 kilometers from the European border (in some cases maximum to 50 km)[3]. Council and European Parliament eventually supported the extension of local border traffic to the whole territory of Kaliningrad Oblast[4] and agreement was signed on 13 December 2011 by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov. Thanks to that, relevant categories of citizens is allowed to travel in visa-free regime, namely: residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast and on the other side, residents of seven poviats of Pomeranian Voivodeship: Pucki, Nowodworski, Malborski, Gdański and the cities of Gdynia, Sopot and Gdańsk and thirteen poviats of Warmian-Mazurian Voivodeship: Elbląski, Braniewski, Lidzbarski, Bartoszycki, Olsztyński, Kętrzyński, Mrągowski, Węgorzewski, Giżycki, Gołdapski, Olecki and the cities of Elbląg and Olsztyn. Therefore, almost one million Russian citizens and almost two millions Polish ones could repeatedly cross the Polish-Russian border without visa. They need only special permission, which is issued once and it costs 20 euro, and document confirming identity as well[5].

Entry into force of the bilateral agreement between Poland and Russia on local border traffic on 27 July 2012 is described as one of the main achievements of the EU-Russia dialogue in 2012[6] and this document became (together with the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement and the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement, which entered into force in 2007) important step to facilitate visa regime between Russia and European Union and to create visa-free regime as a long-term goal. Local border traffic influences on boost tourist and economic exchange and the local governments’ cooperation[7], but also makes easier people-to-people contact, i.a. between businessmen, students, enterprises. Consequently, it will improve mutual trust and root out stereotypes among both nations as well. The case of Kaliningrad could be good example for European Union and Russia and their relations. Not only as a field of effective cooperation, but also give incentive to overcome mutual distrust, which remains serious obstacle in relations between Moscow and Brussels.

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[1] S. Utkin, Visa-free: Modernising the Russians, in: The EU-Russia Modernisation Partnership, The EU-Russia Centre Review, October 2010, http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XV_ENG.pdf, Access: 25.04.2013, p. 60.

[2] Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej o zasadach małego ruchu granicznego, oficjalna strona Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych Polski, http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/20111214MGR/tresc%20umowy%20o%20mgr-pl.pdf, Access: 25.04.2013.

[3] Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention, OJ L 405, 30.12.2006, p. 1–22.

[4] Regulation (EU) No 1342/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 as regards the inclusion of the Kaliningrad oblast and certain Polish administrative districts in the eligible border area, OJ L 347, 30.12.2011, p. 41–43.

[5] A. Kazimierczuk, Umowa o małym ruchu granicznym podpisana, „Rzeczpospolita”, 14.12.2011.

http://www.rp.pl/artykul/769504-Umowa-o-malym-ruchu-granicznym-podpisana.html, Access: 25.04.2013.

[6] EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2012, March 2013, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_report_2012_en.pdf, Access: 25.04.2013.

[7] J. Fomina, Local border traffic agreement for the Kaliningrad region: a success story of the

Polish presidency and a trust-building exercise for Poland and Russia, Batory Foundation Policy Brief, December 2011, Warsaw, http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/ANG/Publikacje/Open%20Europe/Local_border_traffic_agreement_for_the_Kaliningrad_region_a_success_story_of_the_Polish_presidency_and_a_trustbuilding_exercise_for_Poland%20_and_Russia.pdf, Access: 25.04.2013, p. 4.

Karol Bijoś - University of Warsaw (Foreign Relations Institute)

            Kaliningrad Oblast became a region isolated form the “mainland of the country” quite suddenly and unexpectedly.  Collapse of Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union influenced intensively on the whole oblast determining its development for future decades. Due to that fact trough first decade after sudden change of geopolitical situation different measures were taken to deal with the future and development of Kaliningrad with Economic Zone as the most important one.

Talking about Kaliningrad’s history it is crucial to say that words “future” and “development” were not used parallel through the years, when Oblast was special military zone with limited non-military investments. 

Presently surrounded by European Union countries and almost fully surrounded by NATO countries, Kaliningrad Oblast is on the crossroad of its developmental way. Where it will go and what is the possible scenario in the clash between regional pride of so called Konigsgrad-Kalininsberg identity and  anti-separatist, centralistic actions of government in Moscow? Analysing facts, reports and documents I would like to shortly summarise most possible scenarios for the Kaliningrad’s future.

            In this short essay by the “scenario” will be understood  only possible and affordable ideas for the future. Mentioned in the broad literature ideas of Borussia, Fourth Baltic Republic or Special Administrative Region under common control of Germany, Poland and Russia are not going to be discussed as impossible, unrealistic and most of all as counter to major interest of all “actors” including Russia herself.

            Kaliningrad’s issue is taken in to the consideration by few research and analytical institutions[1] as well as Universities. Among all the most important and crucial, is role of Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad with writings of G. Fedorow[2] and A. Klemeszew[3]. Looking abroad, in Poland most actively in the field of research about Kaliningrad and its future, acts University of Gdańsk with writings of Tadeusz Palmowski[4].

Revising literature it is possible to find from 16 to 20 different scenarios considering future of Oblast en-genera. Even though always the compromises are not fully successful they are not doomed to failure. It is possible to suggest 4 points that are and might be scenarios for the future of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

First of all Russian Government would like to improve connectivity with Oblast.  There are many ways of transportation, however what seems to be crucial is the development of direct Russia to Russia transportation corridors. Airport in Chrabrovo with all its needed infrastructure will be developed. In speeches of regional authorities need for infrastructure development is strongly underlined. Those plans are also written in the recent strategy for Kaliningrad development till 2020[5]. Here we see the pressure made by central government, for economic and resource independence of its only exclave and most western part of the country. Plans of building Nuclear Power Plant on the territory of Oblast as well as recent suggestions of President Vladimir Putin of building third line of Nord Stream to Kaliningrad are the best examples of such a policy.  This seems to be general policy of Russia in order to avoid unreliable transit and option for playing role of possible regional exporter of energy.

Second of all, what seems to be important for local authorities with parallel interest of Moscow is the creation of many facilities for tourists and simplification  of foreign citizens movement inside the Oblast. According to law it is still forbidden and restricted to go to the certain places, even though they are the touristic highlights of Kaliningrad. Measures of security are important however tourist sector wont develop without access to the beautiful sea side around Jantarny or Baltijsk.

Third of all, as the Special Economic Zone used to be one the basis of regional development, local authorities desperately wants to keep at least some of the advantages that Economic Zone gave to regional economy. Moscow wants to avoid situation in which Kaliningrad’s economy is based on processing goods from west and then sending them to main Russian territory. The outcome of re-thinking of Special Economic Zone idea will be creation of such a simplifications for local business that it would be much more efficient and self-dependent. Regulations of New Economic Zone will create better conditions for local business for regional demands. This will help Oblast to be much competitive without messing with Central Government interests.

            Due to special geographical position of Kaliningrad it is crucial to underline role of European Union in the process of its development. The local border traffic seems to work quite efficiently however it would have negative impact on  economy of Oblast if the movement would have only one direction vector. Most of Poles spend in Russia 3 hours (time needed to tank a car and cross the border). However on the other side lots of Russian citizens are coming all the way up to Gdańsk to purchase various goods. At that moment when normal tourists need to stand in line of “car gas-tanks” even up to 6 hours they are choosing different destinations for leisure. It is crucial to improve border traffic infrastructure, because crossing points are small and inefficient. This also could be lesson for both sides EU and Russia in their way to abolish visa regime. What is happening presently could be just the prelude to idea presented by G. Fedorow of EU-Russia pilotage region.

            Finally, talking about Kaliningrad and its external affairs it is important to say about NATO-Russia relations. This topic seems to be forbidden and forgotten among the scholars. Interesting why due to lack of real threats and real security concerns from Russian and NATO side, relations are still tuff. Due to lack of confidence and trust among sides mostly Washington and Moscow, Kaliningrad seems to be local hostage of central politics. This can only change when both sides “up there” will create something more than NATO-Russia summits but closer global security partnership.           

            Concluding, points one and two are the most certain and predictable according to one additional factor – organisation of Football World Championship in 2018 in Kaliningrad. This is one of the main projects of the government and due to strong governmental guarantee all infrastructure projects will be done for sure. New rules of Special Economic Zone are also quite possible due to vital interests of local authorities connected with its importance for citizens and by that popularity of ruling politics. Improvement of border traffic might be unfortunately one sided. Development of Russian border infrastructure might stopped by local corporations and owners of big markets. Due to outflow of clients form Kaliningrad enterprises in a favour for polish ones selling cheaper goods. Finally as local authorities has nothing to say in a sphere of security according to NATO-Russia relations, improvement of situation in this area seems to be much more complex than it seems as in this relation local problems are not applicable any more.

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[1] OSW - http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Prace_41_PL.pdf

[2] G. Fedorow – for example – „Kaliningrad oblast of Russia in the trasborder region south-eastern Baltic” – [in]  Costal Regions, nr 19^th  University of Gdańsk

[3]A. Klemeszew – „Стратегии развития Калининградской области”  Kaliningrad, 2007.

[4] Palmowski –  he is author of tens of publications and redactor of baltic analitical journals. Newest: “Kaliningrad – szansa czy zagrożenie dla Europy Bałtyckiej” University of Gdańsk, Gdańsk 2013

[5] http://gp.minfin.ru/Main/ClientBin/Passports/37.pdf

Maciej Wapiński - University of Warsaw (SEW)

       Kaliningrad is often described as „an unsinkable Russian aircraft carrier in Europe”. As an exclave, Kaliningrad has a particular position in Russian foreign politics. There is no doubt that “Konigsberg” is and always will be some kind of tool in Kremlin hands. In the near future this region will be more and more “European” in a cultural sense, but at the same time Moscow won’t stop using its most western region in foreign politics.

              Last years’ liberalization of visa regime between Poland and Russia showed the path for next few decades. In 2012 polish consulate issued 140 thousand visas and 13 thousand “small border movement cards”. Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs predicts, that in this year those numbers will be much higher. Kaliningrad region is not different than other regions of Russia, but its geopolitical location is a strong factor. Konigsberg – how Kaliningrad is sometimes called by its inhabitants – fully depends on Moscow. It’s a part of Russian Federation and it won’t change. But we have to take a look at the map – Kaliningrad is 1200 km from Moscow, 340 km from Warsaw and 360 km from Vilnius. Russian enclave is surrounded by EU countries, which strongly influences the people’s mentality. Liberalization of visa regime creates great opportunities for both Poles and Russians to find a new standard of cooperation. Since 2008 University in Olsztyn and Federal Baltic Immanuel Kant University in Kaliningrad cooperate in organization of common seminars and other activities. Without visas this cooperation will be even more productive. And that is the way in which students from northern regions of Poland and Kaliningrad can build strong connections, which will profit in a perspective of few years.

              There are two strategic aspects of Kaliningrad role in Russian foreign politics: military and energy. Last week the Russian minister of defense Sergei Shoigu announced that in the next 2 years Russian aircraft base will be built in Belarus. Kremlin’s military strategy is rather clear – militarization of the western border which means also strengthening of Russian position in Belarus and reviving of “the Union State”. In this scenario “aircraft carrier” is not only a metaphor.

           Construction of Baltic Atomic Power Plant started last year. Why Russians made a decided to start such a big investment? Kaliningrad doesn’t need so much energy. From the beginning Russia wanted to export energy form the power plant to Lithuania, Poland and Germany. This projects faces some political obstacles on Polish and Lithuanian sides, but it seems to be rather perspective scenario. Kaliningrad in a few years will become important regional energy exporter, which can contribute to strengthening its position in Europe.

To conclude: in next few years local cooperation between northern regions of Poland and Kaliningrad will be stronger. On the other hand, Kaliningrad will be dependent of Kremlin decisions, which is fully understandable. Two aspects of Russian foreign politics can strongly influence relations between Kaliningrad and its neighbors – energy and army. Kremlin decisions in those area will determine Kaliningrad’s position in next decades.

Kokis Kira - SPBGU international relations student

There is probably no need to go deep into describing and explaining the unique exclave position of the Kaliningrad region (oblast). Being a federal subject of the Russian Federation it is more than any other part of the country exposed to the European Union, literally sandwiched[1] between Poland and Lithuania. Its geopolitical position would be enough to attract special attention from the federal center, but besides that it is the vulnerable economic situation that also needs to be addressed.

The internal situation of the region is highly dependent not only on the Russian policies, provided for it, but also on the EU’s strategy.  The external policy of the region is, firstly, predetermined by its position, surrounded by EU members, making it natural and inevitable for them to cooperate, and, secondly, indicates the condition of Russia-EU relations, more than that, reflects both sides’ intentions for the possible developments.

In the essay our aim is not to design the ideal Russian strategy towards the region pointing out current defects and saying what it should look like, but rather try to picture the situation in the foreseeable future, bearing in mind those flaws and the complex character of the issue. This variant does not claim to be absolutely objective and comprehensive (inter alia because we are deliberately excluding any NATO related issues), although aims at it.

We will attempt to imagine primarily the internal situation, because the Russian government seems to have realized the significance and urgency of Kaliningrad’s issue, and has recently approved a government program “Socio-economic development of the Kaliningrad region till 2020”. We would not like to estimate its prospects, the main idea we could extract from the document is that Russia is seriously concerned with the issue and is determined to take action. The ultimate goal is to “ensure sustainable socio-economic development”[2] of the oblast by means of improving of the region’s investment attractiveness, promoting of economic growth priorities, and developing of new industrial clusters and tourism.

Thus, there is no reason to be pessimistic about the future domestic situation. The program is going to receive first financing in 2014[3] and is likely to be effectively implemented. The most important results of it are going to be significant improvement of the standard of living and region’s level of economic development, stabilizing the situation and equalizing it with the average Russian level.

Other than the government decree, the domestic situation is going to be affected by 2 more factors. Firstly, Russia, and Kaliningrad in particular, is hosting the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Large-scale arrangements need to need to be made, significantly improving the infrastructure of the region and attracting foreign and domestic investment. Secondly, a new nuclear power plant is due to be put into operation in the second half of 2010s. It will not only uninterruptedly supply industry and population with energy, but allow for export of it, strengthening ties with the neighbors.

On the other hand Kaliningrad’s economy is going to be affected by the loss of the special economic zone status in 2016, when the federal law is due to expire[4], plus by Russia becoming a member of the World Trade Organization in 2012. As a consequence the region will have to attract foreign investment and skilled foreign labor force (in order to make up for the lack of domestic cadres) kind of “on its own”. These are the factors, likely to shape a more distant agenda.

As far as region’s status on the international arena is concerned, we can also see positive signs from the EU, eager to cooperate. The Union emphasized its “particular interest in the Oblast” in its’ Strategy Paper on Russia for the period of 2007-2013[5]. What this “interest” means is the Union’s concerns about the socio-economic and security aspects of the issue.

In 2012 Russia and Poland signed an agreement on local border traffic. According to the document, Polish and Russian citizens may acquire a special permit letting them travel visa-free within the whole Kaliningrad region for Poles and 50 km zone in Poland for Russians.  The applicants are required to have resided in the border region for 3 years[6]. The effect of this new regime will show up primarily on a local scale. “Easier entry requirements may knit the halves of old East Prussia closer together, and also help break down the barriers of mistrust that still dog Polish-Russian economic ties”[7]. Kaliningrad region will start integrating into the European economy, easing its dependency on mainland Russia and equalizing development levels within the Baltic Sea region. Anyway, this step may be regarded as significant not only in bilateral relations between 2 countries, but also as a test for EU-Russia visa-free regime, so much desirable by the latter.

From the Russian side positioning of the Kaliningrad oblast within the framework of the foreign policy seems to be stable and not changing for a long time. The Center is not willing to grant any special rights to the region, despite its unique geopolitical position. That is why the scenario for the future may include adhering to centralized policy-making at the same time engaging neighbor countries in improving the situation by opening the region to more cooperation. Despite the willingness to integrate it into the EU space and increase mobility, the Union will stay concerned with the high level of centralization, bureaucratization. Some other obstacles to integration are the scale of corruption and organized crime, as well as poor environmental record of the region, particularly in terms of water pollution[8].

All in all, the Kaliningrad issue represents a huge challenge, but also an opportunity for integration. In general, the region is highly dependent on the federal center both politically and economically, and this condition is improbable to change. That is why the future scenario may look like gradually stabilizing and developing economy with our government paying special attention to it. However it is not going to blossom, because only federal efforts, in other words directives and money, will not be enough as long as the region is not fully integrated in the EU space. The Union is making friendly steps towards Kaliningrad, but its main goal is to just eliminate the economically-lagging-behind (actually ghetto) region within its territory. The region will seek to attract foreign investment in order to survive. The central government will not unleash it and grant a privileged status, because this would create discontent within the Federation. The full integration of the region with the European Union will keep up with the speed of EU-Russia-as-a-whole integration.

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[1] Sergunin A. Kaliningrad: Changing Perceptions.// Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and present. 2007. №15. – C. 85.

[2] Государственная программа Российской Федерации «Социально-экономическое развитие калининградской области до 2020 года». Утверждена распоряжением Правительства Российской Федерации от 27 марта 2013 г., № 461-р.

[3] Калининградскую программу развития начнут финансировать с 2014 г.// ФГУП РАМИ «РИА Новости». 02.04.2013. URL: http://ria.ru/society/20130402/930647879.html [12.04.2013].

[4] Федеральный закон от 10 января 2006 г. N 16-ФЗ "Об Особой экономической зоне в Калининградской области и о внесении изменений в некоторые законодательные акты Российской Федерации". Принят Государственной Думой 23 декабря 2005 года. Одобрен Советом Федерации 27 декабря 2005 года.

[5] Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Russian Federation.// European External Action Service.

[6] О подписании Соглашения между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством Республики Польша о порядке местного приграничного передвижения. Одобрено распоряжением Правительства Российской Федерации от 5 декабря 2011 г., N 2182-р.

[7] Cienski J. Poland: easing trade with Kaliningrad.// Financial Times. 24.08.2012. URL: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/24/poland-easing-trade-with-kaliningrad/#axzz2QEt10bOQ [12.04.2013].

[8] Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Russian Federation.// European External Action Service.

Liubov Zagorulko - Master's Student MGIMO University, Moscow

         Kaliningrad's issue was a very popular some years ago when 10 new countries, including Poland and Lithuania joined the EU. Now it seems to be less vital for Russian politicians and the most part of Russian population. But it is still important for residents of the region. And it could have a profound impact on Russian- EU relations. The question is what kind of impact? It could become only one of the controversial issue or an example of opportunities for the future. The former scenario is simple: using foreign policy issues as an instrument in domestic politics is natural for almost every political system. It can’t be done, however without any losses, above all loss of opportunities.

            That’s why the most probable scenario seems to be a kind of freezing the situation. Other words,  it is the most convenient to preserve a current situation, avoiding discussions and disagreement. Russian society and political community show little interest in the problem. Current domestic difficulties it hard for the European Union to pay sufficient attention to the issue.

           At the same time, there is a number of opportunities for Kaliningrad and for Russia itself to establish more effective and more successful relations with the EU. First of all, it could offer a new modality of relations based on variety of interrelations rather than on political statements and declarations.

       Secondly, it is interregional cooperation that is very important for the EU. Kaliningrad could be integrated into such regional system of relations.  It would be an effective way to understand the logic of regional cooperation in the EU and the logic of the EU development itself. In turn, it would help to understand nature of Russian social life.   Such an activity would be practical and fruitful because of smaller level of political bias. 

          Thirdly, Kaliningrad could become so called experimental platform for pilot projects between Russia and the EU, including special visa regime or free trade zone. Although such projects can be considered as rather unlikely and difficult for implementation at the moment, it is not impossible at all but depends on political will and activity of  a society. Even preparation for such project could demonstrate economic, legal and other differences between Russia and the EU.  The diagnosed cleavage should be negotiated and every possible solutions could be found by discussions. Recent agreement between the EU and  South Korea demonstrates flexibility and realistic approach to establishing of relations with important partners. It is high time to reach mutually advantageous cooperation between Russia and the EU, at least on the interregional level.

         It should be emphasized that political will could only provide the framework for cooperation. The genuine partnership should be established between business and social communities. It means that there is a need of mutually acceptable, clear and simple rules of business activity.  Despite the fact the EU is facing economic difficulties the cooperation would be profitable for both sides. In turn, such relations should be based on well grounded calculations in order to prevent Russian side from being disappointed.

         In theory governments express support the third scenario of closer cooperation between Kaliningrad and the EU. In fact, there is an obvious  lack of practical steps to make Kaliningrad's issue a source of opportunities rather than a cause of misunderstanding. 

Begining of the conference

Dear participants,

                 The deadline for sending works is prolonged up to Friday 26.04 due to small technical problems.

all best
organising committee